ABSTRACT

Do aspects of current UN peacekeeping operations affect the willingness of that body to authorize new operations? Our theoretical arguments center on the capacity and costs of the organization – specifically the committed resources and risks associated with ongoing operations – with the assumption that greater existing commitments and perceived risks lessen the likelihood that the UN will create new operations. Related to the concern with risk, does successful diplomacy that produces a peace agreement in the conflict at hand lessen expected costs and therefore make authorizing new peacekeeping operations more attractive? To answer these questions, we examine UN peacekeeping authorization decisions over the period 1989–2016. Our results demonstrate that UN decisions to authorize new peacekeeping missions are connected to two forms of conflict management. First, successful attempts at peacemaking (evidence by peace agreements) increased the likelihood that a UN peacekeeping operation would be sent to that conflict in the aftermath of the agreement. We also demonstrate that the number of ongoing UN peacekeeping efforts are a strong negative predictor of whether or not the UN authorizes new missions. Theoretically, the concepts of perceived carrying capacity and risk, derived from other conflict management efforts, provided the explanatory bases for these effects.

摘要

当前联合国维和行动的各个方面是否会影响该机构批准新行动的意愿？我们的理论论点集中于组织的能力和成本，特别是与正在进行的运营相关的承诺资源和风险，并假设更大的现有承诺和可感知的风险会降低联合国创建新业务的可能性。与风险相关的问题，在冲突中达成和平协议的成功外交是否会降低预期成本，从而使授权新的维和行动更具吸引力？为了回答这些问题，我们研究了1989-2016年期间的联合国维持和平授权决定。我们的结果表明，联合国授权新的维持和平特派团的决定与两种形式的冲突管理有关。首先，在建立和平方面的成功尝试（通过和平协议证明）增加了在协议达成后将联合国维持和平行动用于解决该冲突的可能性。我们还表明，联合国正在进行的维持和平努力的数量强烈地否定了联合国是否授权新的特派团。从理论上讲，从其他冲突管理工作中得出的感知承载力和风险的概念为这些影响提供了解释依据。我们还表明，联合国正在进行的维持和平努力的数量强烈地否定了联合国是否授权新的特派团。从理论上讲，从其他冲突管理工作中得出的感知承载力和风险的概念为这些影响提供了解释依据。我们还表明，联合国正在进行的维持和平努力的数量强烈地否定了联合国是否授权新的特派团。从理论上讲，从其他冲突管理工作中得出的感知承载力和风险的概念为这些影响提供了解释依据。