ABSTRACT

What opportunities and trade-offs do de facto states encounter in developing economic ties with the outside world? This article explores the complex relationship between trade and trust in the context of contested statehood. Most de facto states are heavily dependent on an external patron for economic aid and investment. However, we challenge the widespread assumption that de facto states are merely hapless pawns in the power-play of their patrons. Such an approach fails to capture the conflict dynamics involved. Drawing on a case study of Abkhazia, we explore how this de facto state navigates between its “patron”Russia, its “parent state”Georgia, and the EU. The conflict transformation literature has highlighted the interrelationship between trust and trade – but how does this unfold in the context of continued nonrecognition and contested statehood? Does trade serve to facilitate trust and hence prospects for conflict transformation? With Abkhazia, we find scant correlation between trust and trade: in the absence of formal recognition, trade does not necessarily facilitate trust. However, the interrelationship between trade, trust, and recognition proves more complex than expected: we find less trust in the patron and more trade with the parent than might have been anticipated.

摘要

事实国家在发展与外部世界的经济联系时会遇到哪些机会和取舍？本文探讨了有争议的国家背景下贸易与信任之间的复杂关系。大多数事实上的国家在经济援助和投资方面严重依赖外部赞助人。然而，我们挑战了一种普遍的假设，即事实上的国家只是其赞助人权力游戏中的不幸棋子。这种方法未能捕捉到所涉及的冲突动态。借鉴阿布哈兹的案例研究，我们探讨了这个事实上的国家如何在其“赞助人”俄罗斯、“母国”格鲁吉亚和欧盟之间导航。冲突转化文献强调了信任与贸易之间的相互关系——但在持续不承认和有争议的国家地位的背景下，这种关系如何展开？贸易是否有助于促进信任，从而促进冲突转化的前景？在阿布哈兹，我们发现信任与贸易之间几乎没有关联：在没有正式承认的情况下，贸易不一定会促进信任。然而，交易、信任和认可之间的相互关系证明比预期的要复杂：我们发现对赞助人的信任比预期的要少，而与父母的交易比预期的要多。贸易不一定促进信任。然而，交易、信任和认可之间的相互关系证明比预期的要复杂：我们发现对赞助人的信任比预期的要少，而与父母的交易比预期的要多。贸易不一定促进信任。然而，交易、信任和认可之间的相互关系证明比预期的要复杂：我们发现对赞助人的信任比预期的要少，而与父母的交易比预期的要多。