ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of intelligence on policymaking in the Johnson Administration during the 1968 Prague Spring. It argues that the US intelligence community was unable to provide policymakers with an accurate picture of Soviet priorities during the Prague Spring and did not effectively communicate the increasing potential for Soviet military action. Although intelligence warnings were issued prior to the invasion, these warnings were neither forceful enough to counteract the belief that the Soviet leadership would refrain from invasion nor convincing enough to alter pre-existing policy positions. Consequently, intelligence had little impact on decision-making throughout the Prague Spring.

摘要

本文探讨了1968年布拉格之春期间情报对约翰逊政府决策的影响。它辩称，美国情报界无法向决策者准确地描绘出布拉格之春期间苏联的优先事项，也无法有效地传达出苏联军事行动的潜力越来越大。尽管在入侵发生之前发出了情报警告，但这些警告既没有强大到足以抵消人们认为苏联领导人不会进行入侵的信念，也没有足够的说服力来改变先前的政策立场。因此，情报对整个布拉格之春的决策影响不大。