This paper examines the effects of friendships with the CEO on the decisions of directors of non-profit organisations. Participants in the experiment are active non-profit directors. Results indicate that non-profit directors with no corporate director experience manage earnings less for the benefit of a CEO when they are friends of the CEO, relative to when they do not have a friendship with the CEO. Further, disclosure of the friendship does not result in an increased willingness to manage earnings for the benefit of a CEO friend. The results with non-profit directors are entirely opposite to those previously documented for corporate directors (Rose, J., Rose, A., Norman, C., and Mazza, C, 2014. Will disclosure of friendship ties between directors and CEOs yield perverse effects? The Accounting Review, 89 (4), 1545–1563.). Further, we find that non-profit directors who also have corporate director experience are willing to manage earnings more for a CEO who is a friend, relative to a CEO who is not a friend, and disclosure of the friendship results in increased willingness to manage earnings for the CEO.

本文考察了与 CEO 的友谊对非营利组织董事决策的影响。实验的参与者是活跃的非营利董事。结果表明，没有公司董事经验的非营利性董事在他们是 CEO 的朋友时，相对于他们与 CEO 没有友谊时，他们为 CEO 的利益管理的收益要少。此外，披露友谊并不会增加为 CEO 朋友的利益管理收益的意愿。非营利性董事的结果与先前记录的公司董事的结果完全相反（Rose, J., Rose, A., Norman, C. 和 Mazza, C, 2014。披露董事和 CEO 之间的友谊关系是否会产生不良影响？会计评论, 89 (4), 1545–1563.)。此外，我们发现具有公司董事经验的非营利性董事更愿意为作为朋友的 CEO 管理盈余，相对于不是朋友的 CEO，披露友谊会提高管理意愿CEO 的收益。