From October 2013, UK law and regulations (the Reform) require periodic binding shareholders’ approval of executive directors’ remuneration policy, as well as enhanced disclosure in remuneration reports. These requirements supplement an ongoing requirement for an annual non-binding vote on compensation outcomes that are detailed in the remuneration report. Using a large sample of listed companies from 2010–2017 we investigate whether the Reform has affected pay levels, pay-performance sensitivity, the pay gap between the CEO and other employees, the amount of cash returned to shareholders, and dissent voting on the remuneration report. We find little evidence that the Reform has affected these variables in our sample firms. Using market-based tests we find that market participants anticipated an improvement in corporate governance for some key dates before the Reform came into force. Taken together, the paper’s evidence suggests the Reform has not met its stated objectives.

中文翻译：

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薪酬监管——越多越好？

从 2013 年 10 月起，英国法律法规（改革）要求定期股东批准执行董事的薪酬政策，并加强薪酬报告中的披露。这些要求补充了对薪酬报告中详述的薪酬结果进行年度非约束性投票的持续要求。我们使用 2010-2017 年的大量上市公司样本调查了改革是否影响了薪酬水平、薪酬绩效敏感性、CEO 与其他员工之间的薪酬差距、返还给股东的现金金额以及对薪酬的反对投票报告。我们发现很少有证据表明改革对我们样本公司的这些变量产生了影响。使用基于市场的测试，我们发现市场参与者预计在改革生效之前的一些关键日期公司治理会有所改善。综上所述，该文件的证据表明改革并未实现其既定目标。