I examine whether the informativeness of income smoothing varies with the extent to which the CEO holds inside debt (i.e. pension benefits and deferred compensation). I document that for firms where the CEO holds less inside debt, income smoothing reduces stock price informativeness. This result suggests that CEOs with lower inside debt smooth earnings to conceal firms’ underlying economic performance. I also find that the negative effect of income smoothing on stock price informativeness for firms whose CEOs hold less inside debt is more pronounced when firms have higher debt financing, lower analyst coverage, or weaker corporate governance.

中文翻译：

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CEO 内部债务、收入平滑和股价信息

我研究了收入平滑的信息量是否随着 CEO 持有内部债务（即养老金福利和递延补偿）的程度而变化。我记录到，对于 CEO 持有较少内部债务的公司，收入平滑会降低股价信息量。这一结果表明，内部债务较低的 CEO 会平滑收益以掩盖公司的潜在经济表现。我还发现，对于 CEO 持有较少内部债务的公司，收入平滑对股价信息的负面影响在公司债务融资较高、分析师覆盖率较低或公司治理较弱时更为明显。