The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.

中文翻译：

---

披露重要性和非GAAP收入的质量

SEC禁止在相应的GAAP措施之前提出非GAAP措施；但是，大部分非GAAP记者在其收益公告中均以非GAAP每股收益表示GAAP每股收益。这种不合规性引发了有关企业是否使用突出来突出显示高质量或低质量的非GAAP信息的问题。对于在2003年至2016年之间报告非GAAP每股收益的公司，突出的non-GAAP每股收益与更高质量的non-GAAP报告相关。进一步的测试表明，非监管动机而非监管成本可以解释这种关系。具体而言，在非规范性突出的环境中，突出性与高质量的非GAAP报告相关，当非GAAP报告质量较低时，投资者会忽略突出性，少数使用突出表现误导的公司表现出与投资者监督力度较弱有关的特征。总体而言，我们提供的证据表明，监管不合规可以反映出提供信息的意图，并且尽管有禁止性的监管规定，但大多数公司还是利用突出来强调高质量的非GAAP信息。