I examine how mandatory extraction payment disclosures (EPD)—a policy solution intended to discourage corporate payment avoidance in the oil, gas, and mining industries—affect fiscal revenue contributions and investments by multinational firms in foreign host countries. Using the staggered adoption of EPD across firms headquartered in Europe and Canada, I find that disclosing companies increase their payments to host governments, decrease investments, and obtain fewer extraction licenses relative to non‐disclosing competitors. These effects are stronger for firms that face a high risk of public shaming, operate in corrupt host countries, and have a high exposure to bribery‐prone payments, suggesting that EPD increases the reputational cost of corporate behavior that could be perceived as exploitative. The resulting reallocation of investments from disclosing to non‐disclosing firms reduces drilling productivity and resource production in host countries, consistent with uneven disclosure regulation distorting capital allocation.

中文翻译：

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强制性提取金支付披露对国外公司支付和投资政策的影响

我研究了强制性提取付款披露（EPD）（一种旨在阻止在石油，天然气和采矿业中避免企业付款的政策解决方案）如何影响外国东道国的跨国公司的财政收入贡献和投资。通过在总部位于欧洲和加拿大的公司中采用EPD技术，我发现与相对公开的竞争对手相比，披露公司增加了对东道国政府的付款，减少了投资，并获得了更少的提取许可。对于面临公开羞辱风险高，在腐败的东道国经营，并容易受贿的企业而言，这些影响更为明显，这表明EPD增加了被视为剥削性的企业行为的声誉成本。