When private firms are acquired, buyers commonly rely on seller financing and earnouts. Using a novel database of private acquisitions, I find that seller financing and earnouts become more common as information asymmetry increases between the acquirer and the target. Financial statement audits of the targets attenuate these results, which suggests that audits decrease information asymmetry in firm acquisitions. Seller‐financed acquisitions also close faster and at higher prices, reducing the private firm discount. These findings suggest that these contract structures are an important channel through which privately held firms mitigate adverse selection that arises from information asymmetry.

中文翻译：

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通过合同风险分担解决信息不对称问题：以私有企业收购为例

收购私人公司后，买方通常依靠卖方融资和收益。使用新颖的私人收购数据库，我发现随着收购方与目标公司之间信息不对称的增加，卖方融资和收益也变得越来越普遍。对目标的财务报表审计会削弱这些结果，这表明审计可以减少公司收购中的信息不对称。卖方资助的收购交易也更快，价格更高，从而减少了私人公司的折扣。这些发现表明，这些合同结构是私人公司减轻信息不对称引起的逆向选择的重要渠道。