We present a simple framework for dual-class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity-holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.

中文翻译：

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投票权对公司价值的影响

我们提出了一个简单的双层股票框架，其中普通股股东获得公共和私人现金流（即股息和持有投票权的任何私人利益），而优先股股东仅获得公共现金流。我们将这两种现金流分开，以确定投票权对股东财富的作用。特别是，使用结构协整 VAR 模型，我们发现投票权价值与优先股股东财富之间存在负相关关系。