The domestic bases of trans-governmental regulatory networks are controversial. While rational choice accounts expect insecure regulators to join larger networks that promise to bolster and justify their authority back home, public interest accounts expect independent regulators to join smaller networks populated by like-minded and informative peers. Are regulatory networks more likely to attract self-aggrandizing servants of insecure agencies or public-spirited representatives of their independent counterparts? What are the implications for network size and orientation? I address these questions by examining the regulators who administer labour and employment law in Latin America and find that, in keeping with the public interest account, they are more likely to go abroad when they are independent bureaucrats than when they are vulnerable to political pressure, and less likely to join larger networks of powerful allies than to teach and learn from their Iberian and Latin American peers. The results suggest that trans-governmental networks rest on Weberian foundations – themselves mediated by linguistic, cultural, and historical factors – that contribute to the reproduction of a multipolar regulatory world.

中文翻译：

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监管无国界？跨国背景下的拉丁美洲劳工监察员

跨政府监管网络的国内基础是有争议的。虽然理性选择账户希望不安全的监管机构加入更大的网络，这些网络承诺在国内加强和证明其权威，但公共利益账户希望独立监管机构加入较小的监管机构。由志同道合和信息丰富的同行组成的网络。监管网络是否更有可能吸引不安全机构的自夸仆人或独立同行的热心代表？对网络规模和方向有何影响？我通过检查拉丁美洲管理劳动和就业法的监管机构来解决这些问题，并发现，与公共利益账户保持一致，当他们是独立的官僚时，比在容易受到政治压力的时候，他们更有可能出国，和少更有可能加入更大的强大盟友网络，而不是向伊比利亚和拉丁美洲的同行教授和学习。结果表明，跨政府网络依赖于韦伯式的基础——它们本身以语言、文化和历史因素为中介——有助于多极监管世界的再生产。