Theoretical and empirical studies argue that managerial hoarding of negative firm-specific information can result in large negative stock price corrections once the accumulated information is revealed. A managerial labor market with tournament-like progression provides managers with the incentive to withhold negative information. We find that chief executive officers with stronger incentives to progress in the managerial labor market tournament have significantly greater stock price crash risk, consistent with a greater propensity for these executives to withhold negative firm-specific information. The empirical patterns that we document suggest a negative externality to the positive incentive effects provided by the managerial labor market.

中文翻译：

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行业赛事激励与股价崩盘风险

理论和实证研究认为，一旦积累的信息被披露，管理层对特定公司负面信息的囤积会导致股价大幅调整。具有锦标赛式进展的管理劳动力市场为管理人员提供了隐瞒负面信息的动机。我们发现，在管理劳动力市场锦标赛中具有更强动力的首席执行官具有更大的股价崩盘风险，这与这些高管更倾向于隐瞒特定于公司的负面信息是一致的。我们记录的经验模式表明管理劳动力市场提供的积极激励效应存在负外部性。