We examine insider trading surrounding takeover rumors in a sample of 1,642 publicly traded U.S. firms. Using difference-in-differences regressions, we find that insider net purchases increase within the year prior to the first publication of a takeover rumor, particularly when rumor articles are either accurate (lead to a takeover announcement) or informative (provide substantial justification for the rumor’s publication). Moreover, we find abnormal insider trading to be a significant predictor of takeover announcements occurring within the following year. Finally, passive net purchasing (i.e., selling less rather than buying more) is more pronounced among managing insiders than among non-managing insiders.

中文翻译：

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传闻收购目标的内幕交易

我们在 1,642 家美国上市公司的样本中研究了围绕收购传闻的内幕交易。使用差异中的差异回归，我们发现内部人士净购买在收购传闻首次发布前一年内增加，特别是当传闻文章准确（导致收购公告）或信息丰富（为收购传闻提供实质性理由时）谣言的出版）。此外，我们发现异常内幕交易是下一年发生收购公告的重要预测因素。最后，与非管理层内部人士相比，管理层内部人士的被动净购买（即，少卖而不是多买）更为明显。