Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.

中文翻译：

---

企业是否通过租赁来对冲？CEO 风险承担和经营租赁强度

经营租赁广泛用于融资，但其将所有权和使用权分开的能力也创造了对冲机会。我们通过检查首席执行官 (CEO) 冒险激励与使用经营租赁之间的关系来调查公司是否认识到这些机会。与使用经营租赁进行套期保值的公司一致，我们发现更高的 CEO 冒险动机降低了经营租赁强度。为了解决内生性问题，我们采用财务会计准则第 123R 条作为对期权补偿、动态面板广义矩法、联立方程和变化回归的外生冲击。我们的结果对安慰剂和替代测试是稳健的。