In theory, polycentric governance arrangements are better able to respond to complex, uncertain, and multiscale challenges. Research on polycentric governance challenges these normative assumptions to find that the functionality of polycentric systems is constrained because different kinds of power influence not only the emergence and design of polycentric systems, but also decisions about policy choices and outcomes. This study uses a polycentric power typology to provide insights into the power dynamics underpinning the polycentric fisheries system of Lake Victoria through qualitative case study methods. The study reveals that power by design creates a polycentric structure that could potentially provide opportunities for power-sharing between higher and lower decision centers. However, pragmatic and framing power erode power away from lower-level authorities by either taking over or dismantling lower-level decision centers and institutions. Without a genuine intent to share power among decision centers, cross-level linkages are deliberately nonfunctional or have high transaction costs, creating and intensifying conflicts and competitions between the state and local governments. In the absence of functional cross-linkages, information-sharing, accountability, and conflict-resolution mechanisms are hampered as is the inclusion of lower-level actors in management. Higher-level actors justify taking over functions of lower-level actors by deploying frames of the lower-level's “lack of capacity.” In combination, these factors concentrate power at the center, resulting in maladaptive outcomes in Lake Victoria's fisheries. The findings suggest that improving understanding of contextual conditions that are more suited to polycentric governance is important for refining theory and improving governance.

中文翻译：

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多中心到单中心治理：维多利亚湖渔业的权力动态

理论上，多中心治理安排能够更好地应对复杂、不确定和多尺度的挑战。多中心治理研究挑战这些规范性假设，发现多中心系统的功能受到限制，因为不同类型的权力不仅影响多中心系统的出现和设计，而且影响有关政策选择和结果的决策。本研究使用多中心权力类型学，通过定性案例研究方法深入了解支撑维多利亚湖多中心渔业系统的权力动态。研究表明，权力设计创造了一个多中心结构，可能为上级和下级决策中心之间的权力共享提供机会。然而，务实和框架权力通过接管或拆除下级决策中心和机构来削弱下级当局的权力。如果决策中心之间没有真正共享权力的意图，则跨级联动故意失去功能或具有高交易成本，从而造成并加剧州与地方政府之间的冲突和竞争。在缺乏功能性交叉联系的情况下，信息共享、问责制和冲突解决机制受到阻碍，将较低级别的参与者纳入管理也受到阻碍。上级参与者通过部署下级“能力不足”的框架来证明接管下级参与者的职能是合理的。综合起来，这些因素将权力集中在中心，导致维多利亚湖渔业出现不适应的结果。