Regimes around the world are experimenting with combinations of economic liberalization and revived state-activist strategies, producing ‘new developmentalist’ hybrids. This article suggests that a distinctive variant of new developmentalism is emerging in India. Its paradigmatic example crystallized in Gujarat, before and during Narendra Modi's tenure as Chief Minister (2001–14), and was taken national during Modi's first term as India's Prime Minister (2014–19). While scholars have highlighted the aggressively pro-business industrial policy of the ‘Gujarat model’, closer examination reveals that this state intervention was more direct and extensive than previously acknowledged. The state took on a diversity of functions, particularly focused on infrastructure. These included not only classic developmental activities such as midwifing new industries or supporting select private enterprises, but also corrective functions: disciplining consumers, compensating reform losers, and repairing the bureaucratic apparatus. Today, in the face of predictions of radical deregulation or corporate rule, this reinvented statism is visible at the all-India level. However, its history also illustrates the brittleness of India's new developmentalism, including its tendencies towards incumbency bias, resource misallocation, and debt. Political responses have often weakened accountability rather than tackling underlying problems. Both in India and elsewhere, the sustainability of new developmentalism appears uncertain.

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新发展主义及其不满：莫迪的古吉拉特邦和印度的国家激进主义

世界各地的政权都在尝试将经济自由化和复兴的国家激进主义战略相结合，产生“新发展主义”混合体。本文表明，印度正在出现一种新的发展主义的独特变体。它的典型例子在纳伦德拉·莫迪 (Narendra Modi) 担任首席部长 (2001-14 年) 之前和期间在古吉拉特邦得到了体现，并在莫迪担任印度总理的第一个任期 (2014-19 年) 期间被全国采用。虽然学者们强调了“古吉拉特模式”的积极亲商的产业政策，但仔细研究表明，这种国家干预比以前承认的更为直接和广泛。国家承担了多种职能，尤其侧重于基础设施。这些不仅包括传统的发展活动，如催生新产业或支持精选的私营企业，还包括纠正功能：约束消费者、补偿改革失败者和修复官僚机构。今天，面对彻底放松管制或公司统治的预测，这种重塑的国家主义在全印度可见。然而，它的历史也说明了印度新发展主义的脆弱性，包括其在职偏见、资源分配不当和债务的倾向。政治反应往往削弱了问责制，而不是解决根本问题。在印度和其他地方，新发展主义的可持续性似乎都不确定。约束消费者，补偿改革失败者，修复官僚机构。今天，面对彻底放松管制或公司统治的预测，这种重塑的国家主义在全印度可见。然而，它的历史也说明了印度新发展主义的脆弱性，包括其在职偏见、资源分配不当和债务的倾向。政治反应往往削弱了问责制，而不是解决根本问题。在印度和其他地方，新发展主义的可持续性似乎都不确定。约束消费者，补偿改革失败者，修复官僚机构。今天，面对彻底放松管制或公司统治的预测，这种重塑的国家主义在全印度可见。然而，它的历史也说明了印度新发展主义的脆弱性，包括其在职偏见、资源分配不当和债务的倾向。政治反应往往削弱了问责制，而不是解决根本问题。在印度和其他地方，新发展主义的可持续性似乎都不确定。它的历史也说明了印度新发展主义的脆弱性，包括它倾向于在职偏见、资源分配不当和债务。政治反应往往削弱了问责制，而不是解决根本问题。在印度和其他地方，新发展主义的可持续性似乎都不确定。它的历史也说明了印度新发展主义的脆弱性，包括它倾向于在职偏见、资源分配不当和债务。政治反应往往削弱了问责制，而不是解决根本问题。在印度和其他地方，新发展主义的可持续性似乎都不确定。