Cambodian microfinance borrowers are suffering from an over‐indebtedness crisis. In the past 20 years, the Cambodian government has implemented financial reforms that have commercialized the microfinance sector and promoted industry self‐regulation. Echoing long‐standing concerns about neoliberal microfinance, critics maintain that these reforms have hollowed out the Cambodian state's ability to regulate a highly competitive market, thereby exacerbating the problem of over‐indebtedness. In contrast, based upon 20 months of ethnographic research in southern Cambodia by the author, this article argues that the microfinance market would not function without local authorities performing key regulatory roles of the state. These local authorities include commune councillors — elected representatives of multiple villages — who work closely with village leaders and local police. They are the primary state actors who enforce the property rights and loan contracts upon which Cambodia's microfinance market depends. The author analyses how this local state regulation contributes to household indebtedness by encouraging multiple borrowing, rural out‐migration and land repossession. The article advances development studies scholarship on over‐indebtedness by demonstrating that the inequitable outcomes of neoliberal microfinance can be better understood, and contested, by interrogating the multi‐scalar spaces of state regulatory power.

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监管过度负债：柬埔寨小额信贷市场的地方政府权力

柬埔寨小额信贷借款人正遭受过度负债危机的困扰。在过去的20年中，柬埔寨政府实施了金融改革，将小额信贷部门商业化，并促进了行业自我监管。评论家们回声长期以来对新自由主义小额信贷的担忧，认为这些改革削弱了柬埔寨国家调节竞争激烈的市场的能力，从而加剧了过度负债的问题。相比之下，根据作者在柬埔寨南部进行的20个月的人种志研究，本文认为，如果地方政府不履行国家的主要监管职责，小额信贷市场将无法运作。这些地方当局包括公社委员 - 谁与村干部和当地警察密切合作 - 多个村庄选出的代表。他们是执行柬埔寨小额信贷市场所依赖的财产权和贷款合同的主要国家行为体。作者分析了这一地方国家法规如何通过鼓励多次借贷，农村外出务工和收回土地来加重家庭债务。本文通过证明可以通过质疑国家监管权力的多尺度空间来更好地理解和质疑新自由主义小额信贷的不公平结果，从而提高了关于过度负债的发展研究奖学金。小额信贷市场取决于。作者分析了这一地方国家法规如何通过鼓励多次借贷，农村外出务工和收回土地来加重家庭债务。本文通过证明可以通过质疑国家监管权力的多尺度空间来更好地理解和质疑新自由主义小额信贷的不公平结果，从而提高了关于过度负债的发展研究奖学金。小额信贷市场取决于。作者分析了这一地方国家法规如何通过鼓励多次借贷，农村外出务工和收回土地来加重家庭债务。本文通过证明可以通过质疑国家监管权力的多尺度空间来更好地理解和质疑新自由主义小额信贷的不公平结果，从而提高了关于过度负债的发展研究奖学金。