Extant research on rentierism claims that oil royalties and unconditional transfers are among the main factors sustaining subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs). This article claims that these revenues are insufficient to economically reproduce SUR, as subnational rentier states generally overspend beyond their means. Drawing on evidence from Argentina, we identify two pathways to SUR reproduction. First, rulers in resource-rich provinces rely on ‘hidden rents’ from local extractive industries to sustain long-term spending. Second, rulers in resource-poor provinces heavily subsidised by fiscal institutions resort to discretionary grants from presidents to reproduce their political regimes.

中文翻译：

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无条件转移不是石油：地方非民主政权再生产的经济基础

现有的食利主义研究声称，石油特许权使用费和无条件转让是维持地方非民主制度 (SUR) 的主要因素之一。本文声称这些收入不足以在经济上再生产 SUR，因为次国家食利者国家通常超支超出他们的能力。根据来自阿根廷的证据，我们确定了 SUR 繁殖的两种途径。首先，资源丰富省份的统治者依靠当地采掘业的“隐性租金”来维持长期支出。其次，在财政机构大量补贴的资源贫乏省份的统治者诉诸总统的可自由支配的拨款来复制他们的政治制度。