This paper develops a model showing how the environmental liability regime and the precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator affect managers’ incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and (2) to manipulate the reported pollution. I assume a company with a separation of ownership and control which can be held liable for environmental damages and distinguish between a negligence regime and strict liability. The results suggest that if there is no manipulation but only a lack of precision of the disclosed environmental performance indicator, a negligence rule induces lower actual pollution levels than strict liability even though a negligence rule is considered to be more lenient. If managers are able to manipulate the disclosed environmental performance indicator, they will do so and actual pollution levels will generally increase. While manipulation makes it easier for shareholders to escape liability under a negligence regime, shareholders suffer from manipulation under strict liability due to higher actual pollution and higher expected damage compensation payments. Therefore, the manipulation level is higher under a negligence regime. My analysis contributes to the environmental performance and disclosure literature by showing that the liability regime is an important determinant affecting environmental reporting and actual pollution decisions.

中文翻译：

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非财务信息的准确性和操纵：环境责任的奇怪案例

本文建立了一个模型，显示了环境责任制度和所披露的环境绩效指标的准确性如何影响管理者的动机（1）减少实际污染和（2）操纵所报告的污染。我假设一家拥有所有权和控制权分离的公司，可以对环境造成损害负责，并区分过失制度和严格责任。结果表明，如果没有操纵，而只是缺乏所公开的环境绩效指标的精确度，则过失规则会导致降低实际的污染水平要比严格的责任标准高，即使疏忽规则被认为更为宽松。如果管理人员能够操纵所披露的环境绩效指标，他们将这样做，并且实际污染水平通常会提高。尽管操纵使股东更容易在过失制度下逃脱责任，但由于较高的实际污染和较高的预期损害赔偿金，股东在严格责任下遭受操纵。因此，在疏忽大意下操纵水平更高。我的分析通过证明责任制度是影响环境报告和实际污染决策的重要决定因素，对环境绩效和披露文献做出了贡献。