This paper explores the issue whether feminism needs a metaphysical grounding, and if so, what form that might take to effectively take account of and support the socio-political demands of feminism; addressing these demands I further propose will also contribute to the resolution of other social concerns. Social constructionism is regularly invoked by feminists and other political activists who argue that social injustices are justified and sustained through hidden structures which oppress some while privileging others. Some feminists (Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir, Feminist metaphysics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University, 2011) argue that the constructs appealed to in social constructivism are real but not metaphysically fundamental because they are contingent. And this is exactly the crux of the problem—is it possible to sustain an engaged feminist socio-political critique for which contingency is central (i.e., that things could be otherwise) and at the same time retain some kind of metaphysical grounding. Without metaphysical grounding it has been argued, the feminist project may be rendered nonsubstantive (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). There has been much debate around this issue and Sider (as an exemplar of the points under contention) nuances the claims expressed in his earlier writings (Sider, Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011) and later presents a more qualified account (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). Nonetheless, I propose the critiques and defences offered by the various parties continue to depend on certain erroneous assumptions and frameworks that are challengeable. I argue that fundamentality as presented in many of these current accounts, which are underpinned by the explicit or implicit ontologies of monism and dualism and argued for in purely rationalist terms which conceive of subjects as primarily reason-responding agents, reveal basic irresolvable problems. I propose that addressing these concerns will be possible through an enactivist account which, following phenomenology, advances an ontology of interdependence and reconceives the subject as first and foremost an organism immersed in a meaningful world as opposed to a primarily reason-responding agent. Enactivism is thus, I will argue, able to legitimize feminist socio-political critiques by offering a non-reductive grounding in which not only are contingency and fundamentality reconciled, but in which fundamentality is in fact defined by radical contingency. My paper proceeds in dialogue with feminists generally addressing this ‘metaphysical turn’ in feminism and specifically with Sally Haslanger and Mari Mikkola.

中文翻译：

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相互依存宣言！女权主义，接地和行动主义

本文探讨了女权主义是否需要形而上学的基础，如果需要，可以采取什么形式来有效地考虑和支持女权主义的社会政治要求；解决我进一步提出的这些要求也将有助于解决其他社会问题。女权主义者和其他政治活动家经常援引社会建构主义，他们认为社会不公正是通过隐藏结构来证明和维持的，这些结构压迫一些人，同时赋予其他人特权。一些女权主义者（Haslanger 和 Sveinsdóttir，女权主义形而上学。在 EN Zalta（Ed.），斯坦福哲学百科全书。斯坦福：斯坦福大学，2011 年）认为，社会建构主义所诉诸的建构是真实的，但不是形而上学的基础，因为它们是偶然的。而这正是问题的症结所在——是否有可能维持一种以偶然性为中心的参与的女权主义社会政治批判（即，事情可能不是这样），同时保留某种形而上学的基础。有人认为，如果没有形而上学的基础，女权主义项目可能会变得不具实质性（Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017）。围绕这个问题有很多争论，Sider（作为争论点的一个例子）对他早期著作（Sider，Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011）中表达的主张进行了细微差别，后来提出了更多合格的帐户（Sider，女权主义形而上学中的实质性。哲学研究，174（2017），2467-2478，2017）。尽管如此，我建议各方提供的批评和辩护继续依赖于某些具有挑战性的错误假设和框架。我认为，在许多这些当前账户中呈现的基本性，以一元论和二元论的显式或隐式本体论为基础，并以纯粹理性主义的术语进行论证，将主体视为主要的理性反应代理，揭示了基本的无法解决的问题。我建议通过一个实施论的解释来解决这些问题，该解释遵循现象学，提出了一种相互依存的本体论，并将主体重新构想为一个沉浸在一个有意义的世界中的有机体，而不是一个主要的理性反应主体。因此，我将争辩说，能够通过提供一个非还原性的基础来使女权主义社会政治批评合法化，在这个基础上，不仅偶然性和基本性得到了调和，而且基本性实际上是由激进的偶然性定义的。我的论文继续与女权主义者进行对话，这些女权主义者一般都在讨论女权主义的这种“形而上学转向”，特别是与 Sally Haslanger 和 Mari Mikkola。