This article explores why many public school teachers work substantially more hours than required by contract, given that the elasticity of their earnings with respect to their hours is close to zero. The author introduces a theoretical framework for public-sector employees in which high levels of effort can indicate either altruism (for intrinsically motivated employees) or low productivity (for low-ability employees). Because intrinsically motivated employees derive higher utility from working in the public sector, they are less likely to exit it. Over time, selection makes high levels of effort more strongly predictive of altruism than of low ability. Findings show that teachers with very low levels of experience exhibit little or no relationship between weekly hours and the probability of remaining in teaching. This correlation becomes more positive as teaching experience increases. Similarly, the level of work hours is positively related to self-reported burnout at low levels of experience, but the relationship is reversed for teachers who have been in the profession longer.

本文探讨了为什么许多公立学校教师的工作时间比合同规定的要多得多，因为他们的收入相对于工作时间的弹性接近于零。作者为公共部门的员工介绍了一个理论框架，其中高水平的努力可以表明利他主义（对于有内在动力的员工）或低生产率（对于能力低下的员工）。由于具有内在动力的员工在公共部门工作时能获得更高的效用，因此他们退出这种可能性较小。随着时间的流逝，选择会使高水平的努力比低能力更强烈地预测利他主义。研究结果表明，经验水平很低的老师在每周的工作时间和继续留在学校的可能性之间几乎没有关系。随着教学经验的增加，这种相关性变得越来越积极。同样，工作时间水平与低水平的自我报告的倦怠呈正相关，但对于从事该行业较长时间的教师而言，这种关系是相反的。