When jobs offered by different employers are not perfect substitutes, employers gain wage-setting power; the extent of this power can be captured by the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. The authors collect 1,320 estimates of this parameter from 53 studies. Findings show a prominent discrepancy between estimates of direct elasticity of labor supply to changes in wage (smaller) and the estimates converted from inverse elasticities (larger), suggesting that labor market institutions may rein in a substantial amount of firm wage-setting power. This gap remains after they control for 22 additional variables and use Bayesian Model Averaging and LASSO to address model uncertainty; however, it is less pronounced for studies employing an identification strategy. Furthermore, the authors find strong evidence that implies the literature on direct estimates is prone to selective reporting: Negative estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm tend to be discarded, leading to upward bias in the mean reported estimate. Additionally, they point out several socioeconomic factors that seem to affect the degree of monopsony power.

当不同雇主提供的工作不是完美的替代者时，雇主将获得工资设定权；这种权力的程度可以通过向公司提供劳动力的弹性来体现。作者从53项研究中收集了1,320个此参数的估计值。调查结果表明，劳动力供给对工资变化的直接弹性的估计值（较小）与逆弹性转换的估计值（较大）之间存在显着差异，这表明劳动力市场制度可以控制大量的公司工资设定能力。在他们控制了22个其他变量并使用贝叶斯平均模型和LASSO解决模型不确定性之后，这个差距仍然存在。但是，对于采用识别策略的研究而言，它并不那么明显。此外，作者发现有力的证据表明，有关直接估计的文献倾向于选择报告：对公司劳动力供给弹性的负面估计往往被抛弃，从而导致平均估计的估计值出现上升偏差。此外，他们指出了一些似乎会影响单视能力的社会经济因素。