当前位置: X-MOL 学术Games and Culture › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Play and Spiel are not the Same: Anti-Wittgensteinian Arguments and Consideration of Game as a Kind of Human Play
Games and Culture ( IF 2.4 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-25 , DOI: 10.1177/1555412020973104
Felix Lebed 1
Affiliation  

The differences between categories of play in English and spiel in German (or jeu in French and so on) are essential because any complex ludic category includes games that are organized and restricted by roles and rules. My choice to deal with Wittgensteinian views of spiel (which is translated by default as ‘play’) is influenced by the fact that his argument in German about the impossibility and futility of a philosophical definition of spiel embodies the quintessence of the problem: the linguistic obstacle that prevents correct interpretation of human play. Methodologically, I make the philosophical question of dependence a linguistic one. The article concludes by defending the position that game is only one of the diverse activities realizing human play, which is a basic existential phenomenon that can be considered philosophically through the category of ‘other being’.



中文翻译:

玩法尖顶游戏并不相同:反维特根斯坦论证和游戏作为一种人类游戏的考虑

在英语话剧和类别之间的差异高谈阔论,因为任何复杂的顽皮的类别包括通过角色和规则的组织和受限制的游戏(法语等或JEU)在德国是必不可少的。我选择处理维特根斯坦关于斯皮尔的观点(默认翻译为“游戏”)的事实受到以下事实的影响:他在德语中对斯皮尔的哲学定义的可能性和徒劳性的论点体现了问题的精髓:妨碍正确解释人类游戏的语言障碍。从方法上讲,我把依赖的哲学问题变成了语言学上的问题。本文通过捍卫这一立场得出结论,即游戏只是实现人类游戏的多种活动之一,这是一种基本的存在现象,可以从“其他存在”的范畴进行哲学思考。

更新日期:2021-01-14
down
wechat
bug