Research has shown the potential of nonviolent civil resistance in challenging autocratic state regimes (e.g. Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Yet, little is known about its applicability in jihadist proto-states, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists impose a rule that local populations perceive as alien and when organizational structures capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one in which manifest and organized civil resistance occurred (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali in 2012), and two in which it did not: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen (2015–2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance (the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized and collective resistance by locals under its rule. We demonstrate how variation in the jihadists’ governing strategies (especially the degree of adaptation to local conditions) as well as in the social structures for mobilization (i.e. whether opposition was channeled through civil society networks or tribal networks) created different conditions for civil resistance. This study adds to a growing research discussion on civil resistance against rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). More broadly, our study is an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.

研究表明，在具有挑战性的专制国家政权中，非暴力民事抵抗的潜力（如Sharp，1973； Chenoweth和Stephan，2011）。然而，对于它在圣战原始国家中的适用性知之甚少，即由好战的圣战组织控制的领土。我们认为，当圣战分子强加一条规则，即当地居民将其视为外星人，并且激活了能够进行集体非暴力动员的组织结构时，就会更容易发生公民抵抗。我们通过对三个圣战原始国家的比较分析来发展这一论点：一个发生明显和有组织的内乱（2012年在马里的阿扎瓦德伊斯兰酋长国），另一个没有发生：伊拉克伊斯兰国（2006年） –2008年）和也门al-Mukalla伊斯兰公国（2015年至2016年）。前者主要遭到武装抵抗（逊尼派觉醒运动），而后者在其统治下既没有武装也没有无组织的有组织的和集体的抵抗。我们证明了圣战分子的执政策略（尤其是对当地条件的适应程度）以及动员的社会结构（即，反对派是通过民间社会网络还是通过部落网络传播）的变化如何为公民抵抗提供了不同的条件。这项研究增加了关于公民抵抗叛乱治理的研究讨论（例如Arjona，2015； Kaplan，2017）。从更广泛的意义上说，我们的研究是将恐怖主义，叛乱治理和公民抵抗这三个领域的研究联系起来的创新尝试。无论是通过民间社会网络还是通过部落网络传播反对派）都为公民抵抗创造了不同的条件。这项研究增加了关于公民抵抗叛乱治理的研究讨论（例如Arjona，2015； Kaplan，2017）。从更广泛的意义上说，我们的研究是将恐怖主义，反叛者治理和公民抵抗这三个领域的研究联系起来的创新尝试。无论是通过民间社会网络还是通过部落网络传播反对派）都为公民抵抗创造了不同的条件。这项研究增加了关于公民抵抗叛乱治理的研究讨论（例如Arjona，2015； Kaplan，2017）。从更广泛的意义上说，我们的研究是将恐怖主义，反叛者治理和公民抵抗这三个领域的研究联系起来的创新尝试。