In 2000, one of Pakistan’s largest social movements began: a tenant struggle for land rights on the country’s military farms. Though the military tried to subdue the movement, it eventually succeeded insofar as many tenants stopped paying rent. As a result, villagers experienced a generalized (albeit uneven) prosperity. Certain movement leaders, in particular, became especially wealthy, relocating from their mud houses to big bungalows, replacing their motorbikes with SUVs, and transitioning from tenant farming to lucrative businesses in nearby cities. They also started moving around with armed security, allying with urban elites, and entering Pakistan’s major political parties. Rumors also began spreading that some leaders were using violence or intimidation to accumulate this political-economic power. In the movement’s afterlife, ordinary villagers began to wonder: were their leaders still committed to militantly pursuing villagers’ collective interests? Or were they now using the movement for their own private, even criminal, ambitions?

2000年，巴基斯坦最大的社会运动之一开始了：为该国的军事农场争取土地权的租户斗争。尽管军方试图平息这一运动，但由于许多租户停止支付租金，该运动最终取得了成功。结果，村民经历了普遍的（尽管不平衡）繁荣。尤其是某些运动领袖变得特别富有，他们从泥泞的房屋搬到了平房，用SUV取代了摩托车，并从附近的城市的租户农业转为利润丰厚的企业。他们还开始与武装安全一起走动，与城市精英结盟，并进入巴基斯坦的主要政党。谣言也开始流传，一些领导人正在利用暴力或恐吓来积累这种政治经济力量。在运动的来世 普通的村民开始怀疑：他们的领导人是否仍然致力于好战地追求村民的集体利益？还是他们现在是利用这场运动来实现自己的私人甚至刑事野心？