This article analyzes attempts to redirect foreign policy against multiple crises in Turkey that inhibit change. The gap between the country’s capabilities and resources and its regional and international commitments has overshadowed former success stories in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) by casting an all-encompassing sense of siege, retreat, and isolation. The new narrative and guided political mobilization by government after July 15 in Turkey saw the redirection of foreign policy as a necessary response to the emerging situation, not an offshoot of failure in the previous era. A combination of efforts toward program change and problem/goal change characterized the leader-driven redirection in TFP. This article argues that despite the new narrative and authoritative control of the implementation of foreign policy, presumed redirection or recalibration is unlikely to happen in TFP in the post-July 15 era. There is not a solid plan for change and reform in foreign policy or in the state apparatus at large but rather only a rhetorical emphasis on such actions.

中文翻译：

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7月15日之后土耳其外交政策的危机和变化

本文分析了针对土耳其抑制变革的多重危机，重新调整外交政策的尝试。该国的能力和资源与其地区和国际承诺之间的差距通过营造一种包罗万象的围困、撤退和孤立感，使土耳其外交政策 (TFP) 以前的成功故事黯然失色。土耳其政府在 7 月 15 日之后的新叙事和指导性政治动员将外交政策的重新定向视为对新形势的必要回应，而不是前一个时代失败的产物。TFP 中领导者驱动重定向的特点是项目变更和问题/目标变更的努力相结合。本文认为，尽管对外交政策的实施有了新的叙述和权威控制，在 7 月 15 日之后的时代，TFP 不太可能发生假定的重定向或重新校准。在外交政策或整个国家机器中没有一个坚实的变革和改革计划，而只是对这些行动的口头强调。