This article explores interactions between the front-line officers and recipients of Oportunidades-Prospera, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) in Mexico. Like other CCTs, Oportunidades-Prospera provided monetary transfers to families with the requirement of following certain conditions, including receiving preventive healthcare and workshops. This produced constant and compulsory physician-recipient interactions. This article examines these through observations of programme delivery and interviews with physicians at health centres of two localities of Puebla. The results show that officers’ strategies of implementation and attitudes towards recipients were influenced by the programme’s use of health services as conditionalities, promoting a relationship of authority and obedience. This, however, was exacerbated by the officer’s job position. Those with a permanent contract systematically fostered authoritarian interactions compared to officers with temporary contracts. Ultimately, this study reveals factors that influence officer-recipient relationships in CCTs and their centrality for programme delivery and for the success of social policies more broadly.

中文翻译：

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有条件现金转移实施中的关系：墨西哥普埃布拉的 Oportunidades-Prospera 计划中的健康提供

本文探讨了墨西哥有条件现金转移 (CCT) 的前线官员和 Oportunidades-Prospera 接受者之间的互动。与其他 CCT 一样，Oportunidades-Prospera 向需要满足特定条件的家庭提供货币转移，包括接受预防性医疗保健和研讨会。这产生了持续和强制性的医生-接受者互动。本文通过对项目实施的观察和对普埃布拉两个地方卫生中心医生的采访来检验这些。结果表明，官员的实施策略和对接受者的态度受到该计划使用卫生服务作为条件的影响，促进了权威和服从的关系。然而，该官员的工作职位加剧了这种情况。与签订临时合同的官员相比，那些签订长期合同的人系统地促进了威权互动。最终，这项研究揭示了影响 CCT 中官员-受助者关系的因素，以及它们在项目交付和更广泛的社会政策成功方面的中心地位。