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Reconsidering the ignorabimus: du Bois-Reymond and the hard problem of consciousness
Science in Context Pub Date : 2020-10-02 , DOI: 10.1017/s0269889720000095
Paolo Pecere

ArgumentIn this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond’s thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond’s speech “On the limits of natural science” (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the “hard problem of consciousness.” Du Bois-Reymond’s position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.

中文翻译:

重新考虑无知:du Bois-Reymond 和意识的难题

论点在这篇论文中,我对杜波依斯-雷蒙德关于意识及其当前重要性的科学解释不可能性的论文进行了解释。我在 19 世纪德国哲学和神经生理学的背景下重新考虑了 du Bois-Reymond 的演讲“论自然科学的界限”(1872 年),指出了与当代关于“意识的难题”的论点的联系和类比。杜波依斯-雷蒙德的立场被证明是基于认识论论证,并以形而上学怀疑主义为特征,其动机是当代德国哲学和自然科学徒劳的思辨倾向。在最后几节中,我将展示当代研究如何从重新考虑这一立场及其出现的背景中受益,
更新日期:2020-10-02
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