This paper is the beginning of a reflection on the ways in which the Great East Japan Disaster (2011) might have changed people’s perception of seawalls and hard coastal defence in Japan. A highly developed society that is prone to frequent large tsunamis and storm surges, Japan’s spending on physical coastal defence has few equals around the world. The development of sea defence became a priority during the 1960-70s when coastal engineers and related agencies developed national standards. One of the chief strategies has been the edification of seawalls and other hard structures, which today surround more than 40% of Japan’s coastlines. This technological advancement might have created a general sentiment of security and trust in the ability of these coastal structures to protect coastal communities, their infrastructures and their nuclear plants. On March 11 2011, however, this general sense of safety was hardly shaken by a M9 earthquake and its ensuing tsunami taking away the lives of over 15,000 individuals and causing a material loss of over 210 billion dollars. If experts had anticipated such a large earthquake, the height of the tsunami waves and the extent of the damaged suffered along the coast of northeast Japan surpassed even the most pessimistic predictions. Reflecting on the impact of this tragedy, this paper is a first attempt to appreciate whether Japanese people’s perception of and approaches to seawalls and other coastal defences might have changed as a result. The first part of this paper provides a brief analytical overview of the culture of sea defence and its socio-economic significance in Japanese society. The second part examines more specifically the ways in which seawalls might have influenced people’s behaviour during the events of the Great East Japan Earthquake, including their creating a false-sense of security. Finally, the third part focuses on relatively innovative approaches to coastal defence in post-disaster Japan, with a particular focus on a national project known as the Great Forest Wall. Rather than its engineering efficacy, the interest in this project lies in the ways in which the project might inform us of changing people relationships and ideas with coastal defence.

本文是对东日本大灾难（2011 年）可能如何改变人们对日本海堤和硬海岸防御的看法的反思的开始。作为一个高度发达的社会，容易发生频繁的大型海啸和风暴潮，日本在物理海防上的支出在世界范围内几乎无人能及。1960-70 年代，当海岸工程师和相关机构制定国家标准时，海防的发展成为优先事项。其中一项主要战略是修筑海堤和其他硬质结构，如今这些硬质结构环绕着日本 40% 以上的海岸线。这种技术进步可能会产生一种普遍的安全感和对这些沿海结构保护沿海社区、基础设施和核电站能力的信任。然而，在 2011 年 3 月 11 日，这种普遍的安全感并未因 M9 地震及其随后发生的海啸夺走 15,000 多人的生命并造成超过 2100 亿美元的物质损失而动摇。如果专家们预料到了如此大的地震，那么海啸的高度和日本东北沿海遭受的破坏程度甚至超过了最悲观的预测。反思这场悲剧的影响，本文首次尝试了解日本人对海堤和其他沿海防御设施的看法和做法是否会因此而改变。本文的第一部分简要分析了海防文化及其在日本社会中的社会经济意义。第二部分更具体地研究了海堤在东日本大地震事件期间可能影响人们行为的方式，包括它们造成的虚假安全感。最后，第三部分侧重于日本灾后沿海防御的相对创新方法，特别关注被称为“森林长城”的国家项目。这个项目的兴趣不在于它的工程功效，而是在于该项目可能告知我们改变人们与海岸防御的关系和想法的方式。特别关注被称为“森林长城”的国家项目。这个项目的兴趣不在于它的工程功效，而是在于该项目可能告知我们改变人们与海岸防御的关系和想法的方式。特别关注被称为“森林长城”的国家项目。这个项目的兴趣不在于它的工程功效，而是在于该项目可能告知我们改变人们与海岸防御的关系和想法的方式。