ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the working capital in the borrowing decision of a retailer. The proposed analysis is based on a model with a retailer, a supplier and a bank in a non-cooperative game with price-sensitive demand. The retailer, the supplier and the bank (if concerned) determine, respectively, the ordering quantity, the wholesale price and the interest rate. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is employed where the retailer is a follower and either the supplier or the bank is the leader. Some structural properties are first derived from the mathematical models. Then, some numerical simulations show that: (i) a trade credit guarantees the same profits for the retailer and the supplier as in the case where the retailer has sufficient cash holdings, (ii) there exist some situations where the retailer has a better profit with a borrow than with sufficient cash holdings, and (iii) borrowing decision depends on both retailer's and supplier's discount rate and the retailer's cash holdings.

摘要

本文的目的是研究营运资金在零售商借贷决策中的影响。所提出的分析基于具有价格敏感需求的非合作博弈中的零售商，供应商和银行的模型。零售商，供应商和银行（如有）分别确定订购数量，批发价格和利率。在零售商是追随者而供应商或银行是领导者的情况下，采用Stackelberg博弈论方法。首先从数学模型得出一些结构特性。然后，一些数值模拟表明：（i）贸易信用保证零售商和供应商获得与零售商拥有足够现金持有量相同的利润，