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The Collective Interests of Large Corporations: Social Movement Protest and the Policy-Planning Network
The Sociological Quarterly ( IF 1.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-02-11 , DOI: 10.1080/00380253.2019.1711250
Tarun Banerjee 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT Is the corporate class fractured or it is able to transcend individual interest in favor of a collective interest? I address this debate through a unique application – how large corporations respond to social movement demands. Through a statistical examination of an original database of protests, I find mechanisms still exist that unify the interests of firms targeted by movements. Specifically, policy-planning groups shape and unify firm strategies over whether to concede to or resist protest demands. In addition, I find the impact of these networks is not limited to narrow industry logics, but transcends the broader business community. Together, these findings suggests that when it comes to shaping their politics in response to social movement challengers, large firms do not respond as atomistic actors but are able to draw on their social networks, fostering a broad collective interest. In asking how the social relations of large firms shape protest outcomes, this paper bridges broad questions in organizational, social movement, and class analysis.

中文翻译:

大型公司的集体利益:社会运动抗议与政策制定网络

摘要公司阶级破裂了吗?或者它能够超越个人利益而有利于集体利益?我通过一个独特的应用程序来解决这场辩论-大型公司如何响应社会运动的需求。通过对抗议活动原始数据库的统计检查,我发现仍然存在统一运动所针对的公司利益的机制。具体来说,政策规划小组会就是否承认或拒绝抗议要求来制定和统一公司策略。另外,我发现这些网络的影响不仅限于狭窄的行业逻辑,而且还超越了更广泛的商业社区。总之,这些发现表明,在应对社会运动挑战者的政治方面,大型公司不会以原子行为者的身份做出回应,而是能够利用其社交网络来培养广泛的集体利益。在询问大公司的社会关系如何形成抗议结果时,本文将组织,社会运动和阶级分析中的广泛问题联系起来。
更新日期:2020-02-11
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