Abstract

Despite the fact that the Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted security issues in the world, the research analysing the crisis from the perspective of securitisation theory is curiously absent. This article attempts to pin down some distinguishing features of South Korea’s securitisation of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, thereby investigating why one rarely sees the implications of securitisation theory in the way that the Copenhagen School theorists would suggest. Borrowing the key components of securitisation theory—existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures—this article suggests three elusive characteristics of the South Korean actors’ speech acts as sources highlighting the dilemma. To make the article’s arguments clearer, I hold Floyd’s classification of securitisation theory, which separated the securitisation process into two different stages: securitising move and security practice. While acknowledging the importance of the differences between illocution and perlocution in a securitisation process, this article takes this logic one step further by suggesting the limits of the perlocutionary effect in making the securitisation process complete.

摘要

尽管朝鲜核危机是世界上最旷日持久的安全问题之一，但从证券化理论的角度分析危机的研究仍然缺乏。本文试图确定朝鲜对朝鲜所构成的核威胁进行证券化的一些鲜明特征，从而研究为什么人们很少像哥本哈根学派理论家所建议的那样看待证券化理论的含义。借用证券化理论的关键组成部分-存在威胁，指称对象和非常规措施-这篇文章提出了韩国演员演说行为的三个难以捉摸的特征，这些特征凸显了这一困境。为了使本文的论点更清楚，我持有弗洛伊德对证券化理论的分类，该分类将证券化过程分为两个不同的阶段：证券化动作和安全实践。虽然承认在证券化过程中言语行为和全民赎回之间的区别的重要性，但本文通过提出使全民证券化完成证券化过程中的全民效应的局限性，使这一逻辑更进一步。