Abstract I analyze a model of war expansion in the shadow of international law, where neutrality regimes emerge as equilibria in which only aggressive states are expected to violate the law. By sorting belligerents according to their ambitions (restrained or aggressive), neutrality regimes can help resolve third-party uncertainty over the desirability of balancing. Punishment for violations of the law emerges in equilibrium from self-interested power calculations absent any principled legal commitment. The model shows that (a) neutrality regimes can be effective not despite but because of inconsistent compliance; (b) strong third parties are uniquely prone to failures to balance under neutrality regimes; and (c) ratification of neutrality regimes can be facilitated by mutual and severe mistrust. Neutrality regimes need not be epiphenomenal to power politics; rather, they can support balance-of-power systems.

中文翻译：

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中立制度

摘要 我分析了在国际法阴影下的战争扩张模型，其中中立制度作为平衡出现，只有侵略性国家才会违反法律。通过根据他们的野心（克制或侵略性）对交战国进行分类，中立制度可以帮助解决第三方对平衡可取性的不确定性。对违反法律的惩罚是在没有任何原则性法律承诺的情况下自利的权力计算的平衡。该模型表明 (a) 中立制度可能有效，但不是因为遵守不一致，而是因为遵守不一致；(b) 强大的第三方特别容易在中立制度下无法平衡；(c) 相互和严重的不信任可以促进中立制度的批准。中立政权不一定是强权政治的附带现象；相反，它们可以支持均势系统。