Abstract Many theories of hegemonic orders assume that systemic incentives will discipline the hegemon to maintain a status quo policy supporting that order. These theories make too strong a claim that domestic actors will not see any self-interested gain in opposing hegemony or strategies necessary for hegemony. Yet policies sustaining hegemony are unlikely to remain perpetually exempt from domestic political contestation. Indeed, US political institutions—especially political parties—may provide incentives for actors to undermine hegemony in order to reward their core constituencies or to distinguish their electoral brand from a rival party. Whether by producing overt policy shocks, through diminished expectations of gains from future cooperation by other states, or some combination of the two, these processes can erode the foundations of hegemonic order. This threat to international order has been illustrated by the 2016 US election, but the conditions that produced that result were present long before and would have persisted regardless of the outcome.

中文翻译：

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国际霸权遇上国内政治：为什么自由主义者可能是悲观主义者

摘要 许多霸权秩序理论假设系统性激励将约束霸权以维持支持该秩序的现状政策。这些理论过于强烈地宣称，国内行为者不会在反对霸权或霸权所需的战略中看到任何利己利益。然而，维持霸权的政策不太可能永远不受国内政治争论的影响。事实上，美国的政治机构——尤其是政党——可能会激励行为者破坏霸权，以奖励他们的核心选民或将他们的选举品牌与敌对政党区分开来。无论是通过制造公开的政策冲击，还是通过降低对其他国家未来合作收益的预期，或者两者的某种结合，这些过程会侵蚀霸权秩序的基础。2016 年美国大选已经说明了这种对国际秩序的威胁，但产生这种结果的条件早在很久以前就已经存在，并且无论结果如何都会持续存在。