Abstract Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis.

中文翻译：

---

马尔维纳斯/福克兰群岛是一场牵制战争吗？阿根廷衰落的前景理论重新解读

摘要 阿根廷为何在 1982 年冒着武力夺取马尔维纳斯/福克兰群岛的风险，挑起对英国的战争，此案的更大影响是什么？我们使用反事实分析重新审视这一有影响力的事件，以解释参与占领岛屿决定的高级国家官员的最新解密声明。这些消息来源对马尔维纳斯/福克兰群岛战争的牵制战争和误判论点以及其他现存解释提出了质疑。证据表明，长期权力动态和前景理论可以更好地解释导致战争的阿根廷外交政策行为。由于厌恶有形损失，阿根廷等衰落国家的领导层可能偏爱冒险的军事战略，尽管它们的预期效用很低。如果决策小组很小并且与消除偏见的影响隔绝，这些偏见可能会引发战争。我们的解释说明了前景理论的价值，可以理解为什么某些衰落的国家在面对集合论的反事实分析时会表现得咄咄逼人，并且更合理地解释了马尔维纳斯/福克兰群岛战争。