The problemwith subtitling an exhibition ‘More ThanHuman’, it seems tome, is that, for the ‘more than’ tomake sense, you have to have some idea ofwhat youmean by ‘human’ in the first place. Although we can probably accept that there is broad agreement that a machine that could outperform a typical person in one or more capacity might be said to function beyond human limits, to be strictly pedantic, you would need to specify that the human referred to is both typical and unaugmented. It is here that we would run headlong into the problem of identifying both the limits of typicality and the line that separates putative human beings from the devices on which their existence depends. Strictly speaking a ‘typical’ human is always already a manipulator of technology. One of the founding ideas of the contemporary ‘posthuman turn’ is that the human is the animal that must, of necessity, create the environment in which it thrives and thus can be said to only thrive as a result of its coextension with technical devices. Put another way, there is no ‘human’ that exists apart from the technology which provides for its continued existence. This linkage is important because AI: More Than Human reinforces one of the myths of Artificial Intelligence, namely: that such a development will finally lead to the birth of autonomous thinking machines, capable of both cognition and self-recognition. This may very well come to pass but, in that case, we would be faced with what Vernor Vinge has famously called the ‘singularity’ which would usher in a species more accurately described as other than human. Admittedly, the brochure accompanying the exhibition goes some way to acknowledging this when it admits that ‘the boundary between ourselves and technology [is becoming] harder to see’ and that ‘it may lead us towards new forms of life’. However, the exhibition in general tends to take for granted a common view about what the terms ‘human’ and ‘artificial intelligence’ actually describe. As long ago as 1987, the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard posed the question ‘Can Thought Go On Without a Body?’ His answer was a qualified ‘no’ because thought necessarily operates within the context of an encounter between the body and the world.

中文翻译：

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没有身体的思想

似乎难以理解展览“比人类更重要”的问题在于，为了使“不仅仅是”有意义，您首先必须对“人”的含义有所了解。尽管我们可能会接受一个广泛的共识，那就是一台可以以一种或多种能力胜过典型人的机器可以说是超越了人类的能力，严格来说是ped脚的，但您需要指定所指的人是典型且没有增强。在这里，我们将直面一个问题，即确定典型性的局限性以及将假定的人与存在它们所依赖的设备区分开的界限。严格来说，“典型”的人一直是技术的操纵者。当代“后人类转折”的创始思想之一是，人类是动物，必须在必要的条件下创造赖以生存的环境，因此可以说，仅因其与技术手段的共同发展才使人们得以生存。换句话说，除了提供持续存在的技术外，没有“人类”存在。这种联系之所以重要，是因为AI：比人类更能强化人工智能的神话之一，即：这种发展最终将导致能够认知和自我认知的自主思维机器的诞生。这很可能会实现，但是在那种情况下，我们将面临维诺·温格（Vernor Vinge）著名的“奇异性”，它将引入一个更准确地描述为人类以外的物种。诚然，展览随附的小册子承认“我们与技术之间的界限正在变得越来越难以理解”并且“它可能使我们走向新的生活方式”时，在某种程度上承认了这一点。但是，总体而言，展览倾向于对“人类”和“人工智能”这些术语的实际描述采取共识。早在1987年，法国哲学家让·弗朗索瓦·利奥塔（Jean-FrançoisLyotard）就提出了一个问题：“没有身体，思想能否继续下去？” 他的回答是一个合格的“否”，因为思想必须在身体与世界相遇的背景下起作用。一般而言，该展览会倾向于对“人类”和“人工智能”这些术语的实际描述有一个共识。早在1987年，法国哲学家让·弗朗索瓦·利奥塔（Jean-FrançoisLyotard）就提出了一个问题：“没有身体，思想能否继续下去？” 他的回答是一个合格的“否”，因为思想必定是在身体与世界相遇的背景下起作用的。一般而言，该展览会倾向于对“人类”和“人工智能”这些术语的实际描述有一个共识。早在1987年，法国哲学家让·弗朗索瓦·利奥塔（Jean-FrançoisLyotard）就提出了一个问题：“没有身体，思想能否继续下去？” 他的回答是一个合格的“否”，因为思想必定是在身体与世界相遇的背景下起作用的。