ABSTRACT A central theme in the philosophy of sport literature is the definability of games. According to Thomas Hurka, and others, the argument presented by Bernard Suits in The Grasshopper (1978) refutes Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no aspect common to all games. We challenge Suits’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s views about definition, showing that Wittgenstein is not anti-definitional. Instead, we argue, Wittgenstein is against thinking that all definitions must be essentialist. We also argue that Suits fails to find a feature common to all games. We conclude, then, that Suits has failed to refute Wittgenstein’s views on the definability of games.

中文翻译：

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批评西服（涉嫌）维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）关于“游戏”可定义性的立场的反例

摘要体育文学哲学的中心主题是游戏的可定义性。根据托马斯·赫卡（Thomas Hurka）和其他人的说法，伯纳德·西斯（Bernard Suits）在《蚱hopper》（The Grasshopper，1978）中提出的论点驳斥了维特根斯坦的说法，即所有游戏都没有共同点。我们挑战西服对维特根斯坦关于定义的观点的理解，这表明维特根斯坦不是反权威的。相反，我们认为，维特根斯坦反对认为所有定义都必须是本质主义者。我们还认为，Suits无法找到所有游戏共有的功能。因此，我们得出结论，西服未能驳斥维特根斯坦关于游戏可定义性的观点。