ABSTRACT

I outline an underappreciated explanation for states’ de facto policy-implementation priorities, contrast it with existing explanations, and apply it to the Peruvian state’s extension of “urban citizenship” (squatter residence legalization) in late-twentieth century Lima. Bureaucratic priorities emerge from both the intervention of the bureaucracy tasked with policy implementation and local-level actors found in the policy-implementation arena it targets. Qualitative evidence shows that the legalization bureaucracy encountered neighborhood elites who tried to obstruct the extension of urban citizenship. Quantitative evidence suggests that these actors were unevenly distributed across space and that the state prioritized settlements according to their relative absence.

摘要

我概述了对国家事实上的政策实施优先事项的一个被低估的解释，将其与现有解释进行对比，并将其应用于秘鲁国家在 20 世纪后期利马扩大“城市公民身份”（棚户区合法化）。官僚优先事项来自于负责政策实施的官僚机构和在其所针对的政策实施领域中发现的地方一级参与者的干预。定性证据表明，合法化官僚机构遇到了试图阻碍城市公民权扩展的社区精英。定量证据表明，这些行为者在空间中分布不均，国家根据定居点的相对缺席情况优先考虑定居点。