Abstract

Since its inception in December of 2015, scholars and policy-makers have been debating the motivations behind the design of the AIIB. This paper advances this debate by exploring whether and how the AIIB’s structure follow the design pattern of other leading MDBs, and how well did it manage to integrate institutional effectiveness considerations with promoting its largest shareholders’ geo-economic interests. It does so by comparing the design of the AIIB with that of the ADB and the World Bank, while integrating several approaches to institutional design. I argue that the AIIB’s architects identified certain functional deficiencies in the performance of existing financial institutions and attempted to establish an alternative that will better address these deficiencies. To achieve that, they tried to balance between certain structural features that promote institutional performance with features that promote powerful creditors’ geo-economic interests, as well as invest in AIIB’s attractiveness vis-à-vis other financial institutions. This paper finds that in multilateral development banks power considerations tend to overshadow issues of institutional effectiveness, while sometimes these are successfully integrated. And, that powerful actors are able to politicize certain functional design features and reassign their purpose from solving cooperation problems to advancing geo-economic interests.

摘要

自 2015 年 12 月成立以来，学者和政策制定者一直在争论亚投行设计背后的动机。本文通过探讨亚投行的结构是否以及如何遵循其他主要多边开发银行的设计模式，以及它如何成功地将机构有效性考虑与促进其最大股东的地缘经济利益相结合，推进了这场辩论。它通过将亚投行的设计与亚行和世界银行的设计进行比较，同时整合多种制度设计方法来做到这一点。我认为，亚投行的架构师发现了现有金融机构绩效中的某些功能缺陷，并试图建立一个替代方案来更好地解决这些缺陷。为了实现这一点，他们试图在促进机构绩效的某些结构特征与促进强大债权人地缘经济利益的特征之间取得平衡，并投资于亚投行相对于其他金融机构的吸引力。本文发现，在多边开发银行中，权力考虑往往掩盖了制度有效性问题，而有时这些问题可以成功整合。而且，强大的参与者能够将某些功能设计特征政治化，并将其目的从解决合作问题重新分配到推进地缘经济利益。本文发现，在多边开发银行中，权力考虑往往掩盖了制度有效性问题，而有时这些问题可以成功整合。而且，强大的参与者能够将某些功能设计特征政治化，并将其目的从解决合作问题重新分配到推进地缘经济利益。本文发现，在多边开发银行中，权力考虑往往掩盖了制度有效性问题，而有时这些问题可以成功整合。而且，强大的参与者能够将某些功能设计特征政治化，并将其目的从解决合作问题重新分配到推进地缘经济利益。