ABSTRACT

Public transport in cities of the Global South is mainly provided by paratransit operators who self-regulate their services in the absence of adequate formal transport supply and due to weak or no formal regulatory framework and enforcement. Paratransit operators compete with each other for passengers as every passenger translates into profit. Governments in the Global South have sought to reform public transport services through Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) to regulate and ensure efficiency, address the problems of drivers competition and negative externalities associated with paratransit operations. Paratransit operators have been considered as one of the barriers to public transport reforms such as BRT without much consideration for their style of operations. This neglect has contributed to their resistance and low interest in participating in BRT and has even led to opposition. Consequently, non-consideration of incumbent operators in the implementation of transit reforms has been one important reason for delay or failure in their introduction. In this study, we identify reasons why paratransit operators resist and show low interest in BRT even in situations where public institutions have opted not to replace them but rather invite them to participate in the reforms. The basis is a case study analysis of four cities with different characteristics and different BRT implementation strategies where paratransit operators showed resistance and low interest to participate. We identify (1) loss of autonomy, flexibility and established practices/routines, (2) financial and economic risk avoidance and (3) lack of trust in governments who initiate reforms as a basis for their resistance and low interest. These findings are theoretically substantiated by organisational management and social psychology concepts that explain resistance to change. Understanding and recognising these reasons may help planners in designing more appropriate strategies for paratransit reforms.

摘要

南方南部城市的公共交通主要由辅助运输运营商提供，他们在缺乏足够的正式运输供应以及由于缺乏或没有正式的监管框架和执法的情况下自行调节服务。辅助运输运营商为每位乘客相互竞争，因为每位乘客都会转化为利润。全球南方国家的政府已试图通过快速公交（BRT）来改革公共交通服务，以规范和确保效率，解决驾驶员竞争和与辅助公交运营相关的负面外部性问题。在不考虑运营方式的情况下，辅助公交运营商被视为公共交通改革（如BRT）的障碍之一。这种疏忽造成了他们的抵制和对参加BRT的低兴趣，甚至引起了反对。因此，在运营商改革实施过程中不考虑现有运营商一直是延迟或失败引入的重要原因之一。在本研究中，我们确定了即使公共机构选择不替代公交车，而是邀请他们参加改革的情况下，公交运营者仍对公交车产生抵制并表现出低兴趣的原因。基础是对四个具有不同特征和不同BRT实施策略的城市进行案例分析，这些城市的公交运营商表现出抵制和低参与的兴趣。我们确定（1）丧失自主权，灵活性和既定的惯例/例程，（2）规避金融和经济风险；（3）对发起改革的政府缺乏信任，这些政府将其作为抵抗和低利益的基础。这些发现在理论上被解释了抵制变革的组织管理和社会心理学概念所证实。理解并认识到这些原因可能有助于规划者设计更合适的辅助公交改革策略。