ABSTRACT We evaluate several significant objections to the possibility of group belief. These incredulity objections urge that the very concept of group belief is suspect or incoherent. Although many other objections to group belief exist, these incredulity objections can be plausibly resisted. Smith argues that there cannot be group beliefs, and that it is fallacious to maintain that functional equivalence between individual cognitive processes and group processes may establish group cognition. Ludwig’s distributive analysis of plural action sentences – as well as Phelan, Arico, and Nichols’s experimental studies of lay discursive practices – aim to show that ordinary discursive practices are not committed to group agency and mentality. We argue that Smith’s objections against group belief are contestable, that it is not generally fallacious to identify functionally equivalent processes, and that the burden of proof rests with those who would maintain that processes which are functionally equivalent to mental processes are nevertheless not mental. We further argue that Ludwig’s analysis and Phelan et al.’s studies are not decisive.

中文翻译：

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捍卫集体信仰

摘要 我们评估了对群体信念可能性的几个重要反对意见。这些怀疑的反对意见促使群体信仰的概念本身是可疑的或不连贯的。尽管存在许多其他对群体信仰的反对意见，但可以合理地抵制这些怀疑的反对意见。史密斯认为不可能有群体信念，并且认为个体认知过程和群体过程之间的功能对等可能建立群体认知是错误的。Ludwig 对复数动作句的分布分析——以及 Phelan、Arico 和 Nichols 对非专业话语实践的实验研究——旨在表明普通话语实践并不致力于群体能动性和心态。我们认为史密斯对群体信仰的反对是有争议的，识别功能等效的过程通常不是错误的，举证责任在于那些认为功能等效的过程仍然不是心理过程的人。我们进一步认为，Ludwig 的分析和 Phelan 等人的研究不是决定性的。