Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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承诺回报贿赂或吹哨：公共行政中定期人员轮换的影响

公共行政部门工作人员的定期轮换可能会减少腐败，因为它会破坏公职人员与潜在贿赂者之间的长期关系。我们使用实验设计来测试在公职人员承诺行贿的情况下员工轮换的反腐败效果。我们发现员工轮换不会影响公司提供贿赂的比例，但确实降低了受贿比例和因贿赂导致的低效决策。员工轮换处理的结果，即公司提供贿赂，即使他们很少被官员接受，这与具有量子响应均衡的博弈是一致的。