ABSTRACT

Using data collected from an embedded survey administered to a nationally representative sample in Turkey, we test three common explanations for the re-election of corrupt politicians: Lack of Reliable Information, Efficiency Corruption Trade-Off, and Co-partisanship. We find that when voters receive reliable information that the incumbent mayor is corrupt, an electoral punishment (a decrease in the incumbent’s vote share in the coming elections) follows. This decrease, however, does not necessarily result in the incumbent being voted out, as we also find that many voters sufficiently value efficiency and co-partisanship in a corrupt politician to vote to re-elect.

摘要

使用从对土耳其的全国代表样本进行的嵌入式调查收集的数据中，我们测试了重新选举腐败政客的三种常见解释：缺乏可靠的信息，效率腐败的权衡和合作伙伴关系。我们发现，当选民收到可靠资料表明现任市长是腐败，选举处罚（在现任的投票份额，在即将举行的选举的减少）如下。但是，这种减少并不一定会导致现任议员被选出，因为我们还发现，许多选民对腐败的政治家中的效率和合作党派足够重视，可以投票选举连任。