ABSTRACT

Notwithstanding the alleged crisis of expertise, scientists increasingly act as expert advisors to governments, while organisations at the boundary between science and policy multiply. Experts in such contexts are often subject to contradictory injunctions, associated with the role of either scientist or public official. Role conflict is particularly intense when decisions informed by scientific advice have negative consequences. In these situations, boundary-work is ubiquitous, as scientists deny responsibility by dissociating themselves from policymaking and victims contest such claims. A better understanding of these dynamics requires that the concept of boundary-work be refined. A central distinction between two types of boundary-work is often neglected: on the one hand, people draw boundaries between cultural categories by defining their abstract features (‘Science is X’); on the other, people draw boundaries by identifying concrete things as instances of those categories (‘X is science’). Accordingly, when boundaries are unsettled, disputes over the cultural meaning of science can be definitional or identificational. An example illustrating the importance of this distinction is provided by the L’Aquila earthquake trial, a controversy that has been alternatively portrayed as a trial of science and as a trial of bad risk management.

摘要

尽管存在所谓的专业知识危机，但科学家越来越多地充当政府的专家顾问，而位于科学与政策之间边界的组织却在增加。在这种情况下，专家通常会受到与科学家或公职人员的角色有关的相互矛盾的禁令。当以科学建议为依据的决策产生负面影响时，角色冲突尤其激烈。在这种情况下，边界工作无处不在，因为科学家通过使自己脱离决策制定而否认了责任，而受害者则对这种主张提出异议。对这些动力学的更好理解要求完善边界工作的概念。人们常常忽略了两种类型的边界工作之间的主要区别：一方面，人们通过以下方式在文化类别之间划分边界：定义其抽象特征（“科学就是X”）；另一方面，人们通过将具体事物识别为这些类别的实例（“ X是科学”）来划定界限。相应地，当边界没有解决时，关于科学文化意义的争议可以是定义性的或确定性的。拉奎拉（L'Aquila）地震审判提供了一个说明这种区别的重要性的示例，该争议已被替代地描述为科学试验和不良风险管理试验。