ABSTRACT When and how do regulatory agencies use expert knowledge? Schrefler (2010. “The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies.” Governance 23: 309–330; 2013. Economic Knowledge in Regulation: The Use of Expertise by Independent Agencies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press) provides the most theoretically advanced answer to this question by arguing that two main independent variables impact knowledge utilization in agencies: the tractability of the policy problem under consideration, and the degree of political conflict surrounding the issue. Although Schrefler finds some support for her theory in three cases of regulatory policymaking by the UK Office of Communications, little effort has been made to test and refine her ideas outside of the UK context. In this paper, I take up that challenge by applying Schrefler’s theory to the case of the US Federal Communications Commission’s efforts to regulate cable television between 1956 and 1979. In addition to operationalizing Schrefler’s theory, I argue that two additional independent variables – legal directives and agency leadership – need to be considered when analyzing knowledge utilization by regulatory agencies.

中文翻译：

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监管状态下的知识利用：对 Schrefler 类型学的实证检验

摘要 监管机构何时以及如何使用专家知识？Schrefler (2010. “The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies.” Governance 23: 309–330; 2013. Economic Knowledge in Regulation: The Use of Expertise by Independent Agencies. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press) 提供了最先进的理论通过论证两个主要的自变量影响机构中知识的利用来回答这个问题：所考虑的政策问题的易处理性，以及围绕该问题的政治冲突程度。尽管 Schrefler 在英国通信办公室的三个监管政策制定案例中找到了对她的理论的一些支持，但几乎没有努力在英国范围之外测试和完善她的想法。在本文中，