ABSTRACT

This article examines the integral relationship between epistemic violence and power, specifically at the level of the conception of the individual subject in law. The analysis highlights how the assumptions that underpin the notion of the subject within liberal individualism are constituted by a normalised racial and civilisational order, limiting the possibility of revolution. Illustrating how these limits operate through a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s essay On Violence and her treatment of the question of the subject, this article argues that revolution requires an alternative, or non-liberal, conception of the subject. The article engages with alternatives to pre-existing notions of the liberal subject proposed by two critical postcolonial intellectuals, Frantz Fanon and his contemporary, Ali Shari’ati. Such alternative articulations of subjectivity have implications for how both violence and revolution are understood, as well as for advancing the postcolonial project of dismantling Empire through the foregrounding of non-liberal epistemes.

摘要

本文研究了认知暴力与权力之间的整体关系，特别是在法律个体主题的概念层面。分析强调了在自由个人主义中作为该主题概念基础的假设是如何由规范化的种族和文明秩序构成的，从而限制了革命的可能性。通过讨论汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）的文章《暴力》来说明这些限制的作用方式以及她对这个问题的处理，这篇文章认为，革命需要对该主题的一种替代性的或非自由的观念。本文探讨了两位重要的后殖民知识分子Frantz Fanon和他的当代人Ali Shari'ati提出的自由主义概念的替代方案。这种主观性的替代表达对于如何理解暴力和革命以及通过非自由主义认识论的推进来推动拆除帝国的后殖民计划具有影响。