ABSTRACT In the first decades of this century, Spain still has a high industrial accident rate compared with other Western European countries. Within the framework of the most recent historiographical theses, this paper analyses the historical roots of this situation, focusing on the institutions that historically managed industrial accident insurance coverage, especially during the first decades of the Franco Dictatorship (1939–1966). This study examines how Francoist social policy favoured employers by prolonging the control of this insurance in the hands of private institutions, insurance companies and, above all, employers’ industrial accident mutuals, which excluded worker participation in its management and promoted this social coverage as a business. Archival and statistical documentation makes it possible to demonstrate that entities such as the employers’ industrial accident mutuals managed a substantial volume of the premiums paid by employers, which brought them significant profits through the refund of part of these premiums in the form of rebates. This was possible because at the same time they destined no or negligible funding to prevention and rehabilitation of workers. Ultimately, employers’ management of this insurance allowed them to meet this obligation cheaply, while maintaining a historically high accident rate in Spain and hindered the development of a culture of prevention of occupational risks.

中文翻译：

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“为工人而无工人”：佛朗哥独裁统治下的工业事故管理（1939-1966）

摘要 在本世纪的前几十年，与其他西欧国家相比，西班牙的工业事故率仍然很高。在最近的史学论文的框架内，本文分析了这种情况的历史根源，重点关注历史上管理工业事故保险的机构，特别是在佛朗哥独裁统治的最初几十年（1939-1966）。本研究调查了佛朗哥社会政策如何通过将这种保险的控制权延长到私营机构、保险公司，尤其是雇主的工业事故互助会手中，从而使工人参与其管理，并促进这种社会保险作为一种社会保障。商业。档案和统计文件可以证明，雇主工业事故互助会等实体管理了雇主支付的大量保费，通过以回扣的形式退还部分保费，为他们带来了可观的利润。这是可能的，因为同时他们注定没有或几乎可以忽略不计的资金用于工人的预防和康复。最终，雇主对这种保险的管理使他们能够以低廉的价格履行这一义务，同时在西班牙保持历史高事故率并阻碍职业风险预防文化的发展。通过以回扣的形式退还部分保费，为他们带来了可观的利润。这是可能的，因为同时他们注定没有或几乎可以忽略不计的资金用于工人的预防和康复。最终，雇主对这种保险的管理使他们能够以低廉的价格履行这一义务，同时在西班牙保持历史高事故率并阻碍职业风险预防文化的发展。通过以回扣的形式退还部分保费，为他们带来了可观的利润。这是可能的，因为同时他们注定没有或几乎可以忽略不计的资金用于工人的预防和康复。最终，雇主对这种保险的管理使他们能够以低廉的价格履行这一义务，同时在西班牙保持历史高事故率并阻碍职业风险预防文化的发展。