We examine whether and how private firms differ from public firms in determining corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure policies. We document that private firms are less likely to issue CSR reports compared with their public peers. Adopting a bivariate probit model that accommodates partial observability, we find that the effect is mainly driven by a supply-side force rather than a demand-side force. From a debtholder-oriented perspective, while public firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings and a lower cost of debt due to CSR disclosure, private firms do not reap similar benefits from CSR disclosure. Corporate governance and CSR assurance alleviate debtholders' concern on private firms’ engagements in CSR.

在确定公司社会责任（CSR）披露政策时，我们研究了私营公司与公共公司之间以及与公共公司之间的区别。我们证明，与公共同行相比，私营公司发布企业社会责任报告的可能性较小。通过采用适应部分可观察性的双变量概率模型，我们发现这种影响主要是由供应方的力量而不是需求方的力量驱动的。从以债务人为导向的角度来看，尽管由于企业社会责任的披露，上市公司享有更高的信用评级和较低的债务成本，但私营企业却无法从企业社会责任的披露中获得类似的收益。公司治理和企业社会责任保证减轻了债务持有人对私营企业参与企业社会责任的担忧。