We exploit a quasi-experiment arising from the government-forced changes to the assets under management and investment policy of the Polish pension funds. We test whether this new regulation and its resultant demand shock on the investors' side, leads to changes in the IPO pricing and the subsequent stock's performance. We report material and a statistically significant decrease in the IPO proceeds (IPO size) in the post-treatment period equal to over 107 million PLN (34 million USD). We find no empirical evidence that the treatment had a significant effect on the first-day IPO underpricing or on the long-term underperformance. We conclude that the demand shock resulting from the pension system reform that primarily aimed at solving fiscal problems effectively eliminated the so-called ‘pension premium’ of higher IPO valuations. Thus, it indirectly impaired companies' power of raising money in the public stock market. Furthermore, we report a decrease in the average first-day IPO returns among big issuers that is consistent with the book building literature.

我们利用政府强制改变波兰养老基金管理的资产和投资政策而产生的准实验。我们测试这项新规定及其对投资者的需求冲击是否会导致 IPO 定价和后续股票表现的变化。我们报告了后处理期间 IPO 收益（IPO 规模）的重大和统计显着减少，相当于超过 1.07 亿波兰兹罗提（3400 万美元）。我们没有发现任何经验证据表明该处理对首日 IPO 抑价或长期表现不佳有显着影响。我们的结论是，主要旨在解决财政问题的养老金制度改革导致的需求冲击有效地消除了较高 IPO 估值的所谓“养老金溢价”。因此，它间接削弱了公司在公开股票市场筹集资金的能力。此外，我们报告了大型发行人的平均首日 IPO 回报下降，这与簿记文献一致。