Corporate water stewardship is conventionally internally focused, but now it is becoming a critical issue in a wider socio-political context. Drawing on the theory of self-regulation, we investigate the rationale behind, and the factors contributing to, corporate decisions to voluntarily disclose water information via the CDP. The study uses innovative proxies for corporate self-regulation, including water governance, water policy, water actions, and water performance. Our results show that these proxies are significantly related to the propensity of the companies participating in the CDP to disclose water information. Furthermore, belonging to a water-intensive industry may moderate the impact of self-regulation on water transparency. Finally, sharing water information privately with key institutional investors is a strategic tool for implementing self-regulation. The study suggests that corporate self-regulation can play a powerful role in reducing corporate water opaqueness when mandatory water legislation is absent or not yet applicable.

公司的水务管理通常以内部为重点，但是现在它已成为更广泛的社会政治背景下的关键问题。基于自我调节的理论，我们研究了通过CDP自愿披露水信息的企业决策背后的理由和因素。该研究使用创新的代理进行企业自我监管，包括水治理，水政策，水行动和水绩效。我们的结果表明，这些代理与参与CDP的公司披露水信息的倾向显着相关。此外，属于水密集型行业可能会减轻自我监管对水透明度的影响。最后，与主要机构投资者私下共享水信息是实施自我监管的战略工具。该研究表明，在缺乏或不适用强制性水立法的情况下，公司自我监管可以​​在减少公司不透明性方面发挥重要作用。